

~~SECRET~~

15 NOV 1950

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates

CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 326

REFERENCE: General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence
Section, General Staff Letter of 14 October 1950

1. CIA Intelligence Memorandum (IM) 326 represents an estimate, as distinguished from a compilation of basic intelligence reports, on the North Korean military supply situation. It was prepared at the request of the National Security Council. The estimate was based on an analysis of all reports and information available such as FEAF Operations Reports, CIA Reports and FEC Daily Intelligence Summaries. Studies by War Department ID and previous studies prepared by several divisions in O/RE were also exploited. While a large part of this information was included in FEC Daily Intelligence Summaries, many of the pertinent Summaries were received after the original drafting of the IM and the preparation of the map. Much of the information included in the draft and map was originally received by CIA in cabled field reports.

2. It is believed that the similarity of content in IM 326 and the Far East Command Daily Intelligence Summary was due to the use of similar source material in both documents since the Far East Command also receives the information reports from CIA sources in its area.

3. It does not appear to this Office that there is any danger of "false verification" in the case of IM 326 and similar papers published by CIA. CIA publications are estimates designed for use by the upper levels of the government. They are not designed for use by other intelligence agencies in evaluating individual reports or items of information. It would appear to be unsound practice to use estimates in this way. A given item of information is best evaluated by checking it against other items of raw information in the light of a general knowledge of the situation to which it pertains. Estimates may contribute to the general knowledge of the situation but are not primary sources of raw information to be used in evaluating items of information.

4. No directive has been given to CIA concerning the use of documentation in its estimates, nor should such a directive be given. CIA is the central and highest echelon of the intelligence community in which estimates are prepared, and as such, CIA should receive and use all available information and intelligence without being charged with plagiarism. Estimates are the result of an analytical and evaluative process, not a mere collation of data with sources cited in foot-notes. It would be impossible to document

~~SECRET~~

See 13 Nov 50
NOV 15 1950
slip-4

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100020071-4

the ideas and the masses of material seen by an analyst that contributed to the final product. Any attempt at such documentation would interfere with the timeliness of the product, and timeliness, not credit, is the more important factor in the publication of estimates.

151

THEODORE BARRETT

S/PP
15 Nov 50
[REDACTED] :bh

25X1A9a

Distribution:

Addressee	O&I
AD/RE	2
D/FE	1
S/PP	2

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100020071-4

~~SECRET~~